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MINNESOTA'S CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION
STATUTE AND THE NEED FOR NEW
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF STATE
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
LYMAN JOHNSONt

Conventional wisdom holds that corporate takeovers benefit both
shareholders and society in general. In examining the constitutionality of state takeover statutes, numerous courts have uncritically
adopted this view of takeovers. As a result, they have consistently
invalidated state statutes as burdening interstate commerce, both by
depriving shareholders ofpremiums and supposedly impeding an efficient reallocation of resources. This conventional wisdom has been
challenged by recent empiricalevidence on the adverse efficiency effects
of many mergers. In light of this evidence indicatinga divergence of
investor and other interests in takeovers, Professor Lyman Johnson
arguesfor revised judicial analysis of takeover legislation which will
acknowledge a state's interest in determining how to reconcile investor
and noninvestor claims on the modern corporation.
INTRODUCTION

I.

MITE .........
Background .....................................
Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute .......
1. Overview of the Statute ........................
2. Rationalefor Shareholder Approval .............

STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION AFTER

A.
B.

II.

..........................................

184
190
190
195
195
197

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONTROL SHARE

ACQUISITION STATUTE ..............................
A.
The Van Dusen Decision .........................
B. The Stock Price Premium Argument ................

201
201
203

C. A Reevaluation of the Efficiency Theory of Takeovers . 204
207
D. The Benefits of Minnesota's Legislation .............
Shareholder Protection.........................

207

2. Protection of Other Interests ....................

208

1.

t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Mr.
Johnson received his B.A. from Carleton College and his J.D. from the University of
Minnesota in 1978. Mr. Johnson practiced with the Minneapolis law firm of Stacker
& Ravich from 1978 to 1985. Financial support of certain research for this article was
generously provided by the Frances Lewis law Center at Washington & Lee
University.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
1I7LLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEII'

3. Protecting Minnesota's Business Climate .........
E. The FederalPolicy of Neutrality ...................
C ONCLUSION ............................................

[Vol. 12

212
216

220

INTRODUCTION

A critical component of Minnesota's effort to regulate corporate takeover activity-its control share acquisition statute'was recently held to impose an impermissible burden on inter2
state commerce in APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.
The result is continued uncertainty on the nettlesome question
of whether, after Edgar v. MITE Corp., 3 states can play a meaningful role in influencing contests for corporate control. 4 Unfortunately, this uncertainty subsists at a time of increasing
concern about the consequences of widespread takeover activity, a concern that challenges conventional wisdom that takeovers are, on the whole, advantageous for investor and other
5
societal interests alike.
1. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671. For further sections involving control share acquisitions, see also MINN. STAT. § 302A.01 1, subds. 37-38 (definitions); Id. § 302A.449,
subd. 7 (proxies in control share acquisition).
2. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,331 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 1985). While
on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the case was settled. As a result, the Eight Circuit
ordered the district court to vacate its judgment and ordered the appeal dismissed
with prejudice.
3. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (Illinois Business Take-Over Act held to impose an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
4. In Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 916 (8th Cir. 1984), the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the other component of Minnesota's regulatory scheme, the 1984 amendments to chapter 80B of Minnesota Statutes. See Act of
Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488, 1984 Minn. Laws 470 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 80B.01-. 13
(1984)). Chapter 80B, however, is much more limited in scope than the control share
acquisition statute in that the former regulates only offers to purchase securities from
Minnesota residents. MINN. STAT. § 80B.01, subd. 8. As such, chapter 80B, primarily
a disclosure statute, is more narrowly aimed at resident shareholder protection and
thus is of limited utility in dealing with the proposed takeover of a corporation owned
largely by nonresidents. Even the degree of state regulation upheld in Cardiff has
been criticized as "local protectionism" because of the statute's potential "stifling"
effect on tender offers. Comment, The Constitutionality of 11itinesota's New Cotporate
Takeover Act: The Cardiff Failure, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 853, 884 (1985). The
fundamental policy issue is whether it is good or bad to have an "unstifled" market
for corporate control, and as reservations about such an unregulated market develop,
whether states should be constitutionally disarmed from dealing with any undesirable
consequences of frequent takeover activity.
5. Concern about takeover activity extends to possible adverse effects of
threatened as well as actual takeovers. See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating the .1farketfor Coiporate Controk A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Coiporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1221-50 (1984) (comprehensive explication of diseconomies
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While Congress has recently begun to show a renewed interest in the "takeover problem, '"6 historically federal takeover
policy has had a rather narrow aim-to protect shareholders of
target companies. The takeover policies of many states, however, while aimed at protecting their residents as investors,
have also sought to protect a much broader array of interests.
These interests include businesses, employees, creditors, and
communities where corporations are located. 7 Differing in aim
associated with frequent takeover activity); Williams, It's Timefor a Takeover Voratorium, Fortune, July 22, 1985, at 133-34 (expression of concern about takeover activity
by former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman). For the views of a longtime critic of hostile takeovers, see generally R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 140-72 (1983).

Concern about the effects of takeovers on the economy and society is evident
from the great deal of scholarly attention given to the subject. Some of this commentary is beginning to challenge the widely-accepted view of many academics that takeovers are generally desirable, and is focusing both on possible deleterious
consequences of such activity and present inability to fully assess its impact. For example, in November of 1985, Columbia University's Center for Law and Economic
Studies held a three day conference on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control. Many of the papers presented were noticeably less sanguine about takeovers
than much earlier writing on the subject.
There are, of course, a great variety of concerns about the effects of takeover
activity-actual and threatened-on persons and groups other than investors. One
way to classify many of these misgivings is to separate the concern for the effects on
persons whose lives are directly affected by a particular corporation from concerns
that are more national in scope. "Stakeholders" in specific corporations such as employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, and local communities fall within the former
category. Diversion of credit to unproductive uses, narrow management focus on
short run economic performance, inordinate use of debt, and waste of society's resources fall within the latter category. Obviously, the distinction is somewhat artificial. Nonetheless, it serves as a reminder that while there are persons and groups
quite interested in the fate of individual corporations, there is also a larger societal
concern about the cumulative effects of takeovers. In this Article, the term
"noninvestors" will be used to refer to all such interests unless otherwise specified.
6. For example, Congressman Timothy Wirth of Colorado, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, has held extensive hearings on the
subject of corporate takeovers. Indicative of the complexity of the issue is his comment that ". . . the more I know about the issue, the less sure I am about what to
do." Phillips, Congress Responds to Hostile Tender Offers, THE Bus. LAw. UPDATE, September/October 1985, at 3. It appears unlikely that Congress will take action in the
near future, particularly since the present Administration is seeking to further reduce
federal regulation of merger activity. Bradley, Hands-off Polic, for .lergers: 1'.
S.Seeks to
Put It on the Books, The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 28, 1986, at 19.
7. See generally Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its After lath, 40 Bus. LAw. 671, 674 n.19 (1985) (states have historically taken "benevolent bureaucracy" approach to takeover regulation). Chapter 80B is prefaced by
legislative findings on the pernicious consequences of takeovers, particularly hostile
takeovers. 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71. The interests cited as damaged by such activ-
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and method from pro-investor federal policy, such state legislation inevitably faces the question of federal preemption.
Seeking to influence the acquisition of corporate stock and
thus the flow of capital within the national market, state legislation also encounters the possibility that it improperly regulates
interstate commerce.
Beyond these constitutional objections, state takeover policy
has sometimes been viewed as deceptive. While purporting to
protect various noninvestor interests which vitally depend on
the modern corporation," state takeover policies are regarded
by some as management-backed strategems to entrench incumbent (incompetent) management.C) Whether duplicitous or
not, state takeover statutes have played a relatively minor role
ity were not merely those of investors, but included employees, communities, customers, suppliers, and businesses themselves. Id.; see Comment, supra note 4, at 869
n.92. Among the purposes of Chapter 80 B was to "assure that the impacts of takeovers on all affected constituencies are identified and disclosed prior to the consummation of these transactions ....
" 1984 Minn. Laws at 471.
8. It is increasingly recognized that there are many groups in society that have a
strong interest in the activities of major corporations, and that the claims of such
groups ought to be considered in corporate decisionmaking. This being the case,
there is increasing uneasiness with the following traditional premise:
that the stockholders are the corporation, and Ithat] undivided lovaltv is
owed to the stockholders. If the corporation is viewed simply as a collect'ion
of capital pooled for the purpose of profits, then the premise is plausible;
the sole interest of the corporation is gain for the shareholders. This is the
traditional conception of the corporation. There is, however, substantial
doubt that this is an adequate conception of the modern business corporation. There is an increasing weight of opinion that the corporation should
be viewed as a social and economic institution which has interests other than
those of the shareholders that it can and ought to serve.
Summers, Codetermination in the U'nited S/ates: AI Projection of Problems and Potentials. 4 J.
COMP. CORP. LAw & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
Certainly an exclusive focus on shareholder well-being is not essential to economic success, a point made by contrasting American and Japanese attitudes toward
corporate priorities:
. . . American culture accepts, even encourages, the breaking of relationships. Economic relationships, which Americans assume to be sharply different from personal relationships, are supposed to be broken in order that
the "market" may function freely and vigorously . . . . [In Japani. economic enterprises are assumed to exist primarily for the benefit of those
who work within them or otherwise depend upon them for their livelihood,
as opposed to those who invest capital in them.
Reich, Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 697, 704-05 (1985).
For a recent, provocative challenge to the traditional view that a corporation is
an economic institution existing only to bring gain to its shareholders, see White,
tlow Should Wle Talk About Coiporations? The Languages of Economics and Citizenship. 94
YALE L. J. 1416 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Comment, sopra note 4, at 865 n.77; Jacobs, ..An-Takeover Law Favors
.MlanagersOver Shareholders, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Mar. 10, 1985, at 27A, col. 1.
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in preventing hostile battles for corporate control due to their
questionable constitutional status.' 0 This was reinforced in
1982 when the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Illinois "anti-takeover" statute, a statute then
typical of state regulatory efforts."
Yet, a nagging question remains. Is enough known about
the consequences of actual takeovers and the responses engendered in target company management by the threat of possible
takeovers to make the following unqualified statements about
their social utility?
The available evidence, however, is that mergers and acquisitions increase national wealth. They improve efficiency,
transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate effective corporate management. They also help recapitalize firms so that their financial structures are more in line
2
with prevailing market conditions.'
To date, such pronouncements could be made because
many proponents of the evidence on which such statements
are grounded-so-called "stock price" evidence'S-have made
a critical assumption. They have assumed that stock market
prices are a "reliable barometer" of a takeover's benefit for society and that a net positive change in the value of an acquirer's
and a target's shares indicates that "the transaction creates
10. See Warren, supra note 7, at 678 n.52, 679 n.57 (collection of cases in which
state takeover statutes were challenged on constitutional grounds).
11. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
12. Economic Report Of The President, transmitted to Congress together with
the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, February, 1985, at 196
[hereinafter cited as 1985 Economic Report]. The 1985 Economic Report argued
that additional regulation of takeovers was unnecessary:
To the extent government regulations impose costs on bidders, or reduce a
bidder's chances for success, fewer takeover attempts will be made. This
tends to insulate corporate managements from the competitive pressures of
the external market for corporate control. Stockholders, as a group, will
also suffer as a result of excessive regulation because it reduces the chance
to earn takeover premiums.
Id. at 191.
13. Id. at 196-98. See also Address entitled, Tender Offers: The Agments and the
Evidence by Charles C. Cox, Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the 1985 National Conference of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 1, 1985) (copy of address on file at the William Mitchell Law Review
office) (a pro-takeover presentation summarizing results of recent SEC study of stock
price performance in 228 tender offers); see generally Jensen & Ruback, The .1arketfor
Coiporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (summary of
evidence).
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wealth and is beneficial."' 4 It is clear from the stock price evidence that takeovers do lead to substantial increases in a target
company's stock price and to lesser increases in the acquirer's
stock price, thereby benefiting shareholders. If such stock
price evidence can also be viewed as a proxy measure of the
consequences of takeovers for society at large, then it can be
concluded that the interests of society and those of shareholders coincide and that each gains from takeover activity. Having
these commendable consequences, the argument goes, take5
overs should be encouraged, not deterred, by public policy.'
This interpretation of stock market price evidence has not
failed to find its way into judicial thinking. Indeed, it was precisely this line of economic reasoning that the courts in MITE
and Van Dusen adopted in finding the Illinois and Minnesota
takeover statutes to impose unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce. The effects on interstate commerce of such
regulation were succinctly described by the Supreme Court:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to
their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mecha-

nism provides incumbent management to16 perform well so
that stock prices remain high is reduced.
Recent anecdotal and direct empirical evidence has now
challenged the claims made for the stock price evidence. 1 7 In
effect, the new evidence calls into question the assumption that
the existence of stock price increases in corporate takeovers
14. 1985 Economic Report, supra note 12, at 197. The report states: " Stock
market prices thereby provide a reliable barometer of the likely consequences of
takeover transactions. If the aggregate net change in the value of acquirers' and
targets' shares is positive as a result of a takeover, then the transaction creates wealth
and is beneficial." Id.
15. In spite of this positive view of takeovers, some financial economists candidly
acknowledge uncertainty as to the reasons for the claimed wealth increases. Professor Bradley stated the following in proceedings before the Securities and Exchange
Commission: "The point is that it's taken us this time to get to this point in the
aggregate data, and that's exactly what we want to do, find out exactly where those
synergies are coming from." Secin lies and Exchange Commission Proceedings: Economic
Forum on Tender Offers (Feb. 20, 1985) (statement by Professor Bradley) (copy on file at
the William Mitchell Law Review office).
16. .1ITE, 457 U.S. at 643 (emphasis added) (cited in 1'an Dusen, [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,192; Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo.
1985)).
17. See ifra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. The 1985 Economic Report of
the President acknowledged that stock price evidence was only a "barometer" of the
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implies efficiency gains in the use of society's resources. If the
new evidence is correct, or if it at least raises some doubt as to
whether we are sufficiently informed to authoritatively endorse
corporate takeovers, then judicial opinions that rely on an efficiency theory of takeovers to analyze the "burden" on interstate commerce of state takeover legislation may be
fundamentally flawed. State legislation that "burdens" commerce by reducing takeover activity may not impair society's
desire for an efficient use of resources as certain commentators
and courts have thought. The effects of state takeover legislation on interstate commerce may be less than, or at least different from, those described in MITE and Van Dusen. The chief
identifiable effect may simply be that, by possibly curbing takeover activity, state legislation reduces the opportunity for investors to receive premiums for their stock. If one believes
that corporations exist for the sole purpose of providing takeover premiums for shareholders, invalidating such statutes
outcome may not be a particularly disturbing outcome. If one
takes a broader view of the corporation's role in modern society, preventing states from protecting noninvestor interests is
troubling and must be regarded as the unfortunate product of
an analysis that is too shallow and simple to deal with the complexities and unknowns of the takeover phenomenon.
This Article first briefly describes the post-MITE efforts of
certain states to utilize their corporate statutes as a means of
regulating corporate takeovers. Next, the approach of one
such statute-Minnesota's control share acquisition statutewill be outlined. Finally, the reasoning of Van Dusen will be
examined through an elaboration of the ideas raised in this introduction. It will be suggested that judicial reliance on stock
price evidence as the basis for commerce clause analysis may
be unwarranted in light of challenges to the efficiency claims of
that evidence. Failure to employ more refined analysis means
that takeovers will proceed unchecked by state legislation, not
because of any confidence that society as a whole is well served
by them, but because they produce premiums for investors. As
consequences of takeovers and that, ideally, more direct evidence would be examined. 1985 Economic Report, supra note 12, at 196-97.
The more direct evidence suggests that the takeover phenomenon is more complex than is acknowledged by proponents of stock price evidence. While very appealing to judges seeking "scientific" solutions to the questions raised by state takeover
legislation, relying on stock price evidence may mislead more than guide.
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such, utilization of an efficiency theory of takeovers to analyze
state takeover legislation will, perhaps unwittingly, create a
pro-investor, pro-takeover bias. Conversely, adoption of a less
wooden, more inclusive analysis may mean that some state legislation, motivated to curb perceived adverse consequences of
takeovers to important noninvestor interests, is more likely to
be upheld.
I.

STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION AFTER

A.

MITE

Background

Unlike federal policy which is aimed exclusively at shareholder protection, state laws regulating takeover activity often
have broader purposes. While citing investor protection as at
least one of their aims, state legislation also seeks to protect
business entities and their dependents such as employees and
local communities.1 8 The states' fear, whether well-founded or
not,' is that if takeovers lead to plant closings and employee
layoffs, 2°1 then the consequences might be more severe to a
18. See Warren, supra note 7, at 674 & n.19. Having protection of local interests
as a goal, pre-MITE statutes were often criticized as unconstitutional. See
Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 213, 241-53 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover
Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 15-32 (1976); but see Boehm,
State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover
Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 741-46 (1979)(states have economic interest
in regulating corporations situated in that state).
19. This is an issue on which there is very little direct evidence. "[T]here is no
decisive statistical data available to show whether this wave [of mergers], and the
previous wave, have been good, bad, or indifferent for the economy, for society, for
workers." M. GREEN & J. BERRY, THE CHALLENGE OF HIDDEN PROFITS: REDUCING
CORPORATE BUREAUCRACY AND WASTE 215 (1985). See Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr.,
former SEC Commissioner, 1984 George M. Ferris Lecture, Trinity College, Hartford, Conn. (Nov. 19, 1984). (copy of address on file at the William Mitchell Law
Review office). Even the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers noted the lack
of direct, conclusive evidence on the effects of hostile takeovers. "After considerable
study, discussion and consideration of commentators' views, the Committee finds
that there is insufficient basis for concluding that takeovers are either per se beneficial or detrimental to the economy or the securities markets in general, or to issuers
or their shareholders, specifically." SECURITIES AND'EXCHANGE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS, at xvii (luly 8,
1983)[hereinafter cited as SEC ADVISORY REPORT] (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office). Such evidence as does exist, for example on plant closings,
appears not to have isolated takeovers as a factor. See, e.g.,R. Schmenner, .4spects of
Industrial Plant Closings, reprinted in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 191
(B. Block, et al. eds. 1984).
20. See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488 §§ 1,2, 1984 Minn. Laws 470-71 (legislative
intent). This is of particular concern with the increasingly common "bust-up" take-

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/1

8

Johnson: Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for Ne
19861

CON-TROL SHARE ACQI "ISITIOA' ST T "TE

state's residents and economy than would a loss by shareholders (many of whom may live out of state) of a stock premium.
While pre-MITE statutes and regulations varied in their
methods of regulation,' many of them followed certain patterns. The statutes often required disclosures beyond those

imposed by the federal Williams Act,22 sometimes well in advance of the commencement of the tender offer. 23 Furthermore, state administrators were often authorized to hold
hearings and to prevent an offer from proceeding if it was believed to be unfair or deficient in its disclosures.24 While state
regulations held many possibilities for stopping or delaying a
tender offer that were undoubtedly favored by target management and opposed by bidders,2 5 they were almost routinely de26
clared unconstitutional.
In 1982, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act 2 7 as unconstitutional under the commerce
clause because it imposed burdens on interstate commerce
that were excessive in light of the local interests the Act purported to further. 28 Since that decision, many other state statutes have also been declared unconstitutional.2) Given state
overs in which an acquisition is financed by selling off pieces of the acquired
company.
21. See Warren, supra note 7,at 676-79; see also Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover
Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky o Coiporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L.
REV. 3, 6-10 (1984).
22. See. e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-6-2(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 803(2) (1964 & Supp. 1985-86).
23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-4(a) (1985) (30 day notice period).
24. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515, subd. 1(2) (Vernon 1979).
25. See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 238-39; Wilner & Landy, supra note 18, at
26. In commenting on the effects of the delay in the battle for Conwed Corp. caused
by the disclosure requirements of Minnesota Statutes chapter 80B, F.T.
Weverhouser, Conwed's Chief Executive Officer, stated that "[t]he law has been a
great help to us .
I..".lnskip, Efforts to Fight Hostile Business Takeovers, Minneapolis
Star & rrib., Jan. 9, 1985, at 17A, col. 3.
26.

For a collection of cases that declared state takeover statutes unconstitu-

tional, see Warren, supra note 7, at 678 n.5 2 .
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.51-.70 (1981) (repealed 1983).
28. MITE. 457 U.S. at 646. Four Justices (White, Powell, Stevens, and
O'Connor) and ChiefJustice Burger reached this conclusion. Id. at (42-43, 646, 65455. Three Justices (White, Stevens, and O'Connor) and Chief Justice Burger also
found the statute to directly regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 642, 655. TwoJustices (White and Blackmun) and ChiefJustice Burger found the Illinois statute to be
preempted by federal takeover law. Id.at 639. The VITE decision has been extensively reviewed. For an excellent summary of the Supreme Court's analysis of the
Illinois Statute, see Comment, supra note 4, at 859-65.
29. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1431 (10th Cir.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
I'ILLL4M.MIITCHELL

L1 I7 REI'EI[l

[Vol. 12

aims of retaining businesses as independent entities and protecting those interests that rely on the continuation of management-formulated operating policies, aims that are quite
different from federal takeover policy, the legal question facing
state legislatures was whether MITE left any meaningful room
30
for states to accomplish their aims.
Particularly encouraging for continued, if narrowed, state involvement in regulating corporate takeovers were statements
in the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens.
Joining in Justice White's indirect burden on commerce analysis of the Illinois Act, Justice Powell stated that he favored this
position because its "reasoning leaves some room for state
regulation of tender offers." 3' He acknowledged the importance of corporations to the "general public interest" and recognized that significant disruption to state and local economies
can occur upon the relocation of corporate headquarters.32
Moreover, he agreed with Justice Stevens that "the Williams
Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assureat least in some circumstances-greater protection to interests
that include, but often are broader than those of incumbent
management."3 3 Although he did not elaborate, Justice Powell
obviously recognized that federal policy was a little narrow in
not addressing the interests of those persons who, while not
investors, clearly have a significant stake in corporate activities.
1983) (Oklahoma Statute violates commerce clause); Telvest v.Bradshaw, 697 F.2d
576, 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia Statute violates commerce clause); National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Statute
violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp., [Current) FED. SEC. L. RPrR. (CCH) 1 92,244, at 91,728 (W.D. OkI. 1985) (Oklahoma's
Energy Resource Conservation Act violates commerce clause); lcahn v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. at 1420 (Missouri control share acquisition statute as applied to foreign corporation violates commerce and supremacy clauses); L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson,
ICurrentl FED. SEC. L. RvrR. (CCH) 1 92,271, at 91,876, 91,879 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Michigan Statute applied to corporation not having securities registered under federal securities law does not violate commerce clause but was preempted). Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919, 922 (N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire Statute
violates commerce clause). Bit see Cardiff 751 F.2d at 914; Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.
v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1038-40 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts Statute not preempted; case remanded for commerce clause determination).
30. See Profusek & Gompf, supra note 21, at 20: Warren, stupra note 7, at 694.
31. .MITE. 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J.,concurring).
32. Id. See Boehm, supra note 18, at 741-46 ("vitality and attractiveness of life in
the community" are important motivations for state regulation).
33. MITE. 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Certain states 34 have seized on the perceived "window ' ' 35 for
permissible regulation and have turned to their state corporate
laws as a constitutionally "safe" means of regulating certain
facets of a takeover.3M The rationale for using corporate laws
as an avenue of regulating takeovers stems, in part, from the
notion that states can govern the "internal affairs" of a corpo37
ration formed under its laws-i.e., "domestic" corporations.
Thus, if a state's corporate statutes could be brought to bear
on certain aspects of the takeover process, states could again
constitutionally regulate in this area. While the Supreme
Court in MITE intimated some general disaffection for the
"internal affairs" argument in the takeover setting, it ultimately rejected the defense simply because the Illinois legisla38
tion applied to foreign as well as domestic corporations.
The post-MITE strategy in Ohio, 39 Maryland, 4 ° Wisconsin, 4 1
34. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
35. 12 Wis. Sec. Bulletin, No. 1, at 2 (Jan., 1984) ("[It is clear that there is a
'window' in the regulation of take-over offers through which states can exercise jurisdiction ....
").
36. One commentator, while cautioning that the SEC Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers and the Commission itself did not have such post-MITE state regulations in mind, concludes that "the Advisory Committee and the SEC have rejected
any role for the states in the direct regulation of tender offers, while preserving most of
the states' abilities to regulate other phases of the takeover process through the substantive internal affairs provisions of their general corporation statutes." Sargent, Do
the Second-Genera/ion State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. RE'.
3, 4 & n.5 (1985); but see SEC ADVISORY REPORT supra note 19, at 34-35 (Committee
Recommendation 33).
37. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). The Court stated that "corporations are
creatures of state law [and] . . . except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the
internal affairs of the corporation." Id.
38. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46. Illinois obviously could not defend regulation of
foreign corporations under the "internal affairs" doctrine.
39. Omto REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.823 (Page 1985). Ohio's Statute requires target shareholder approval of a bidder's acquisition of controlling blocks of target
company stock. See id. § 1701.831. Minnesota's control share acquisition statute is
modeled after this approach.
40. MD. CoRP's. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985). Maryland's Statute imposes super-majority voting requirements and "fair price" provisions on business combinations.
41. In 1984, Wisconsin amended its existing takeover law and its corporate statutes. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-25 (West 1985 Special Pamphlet); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 180.01-.995 (West 1957 & Supp. 1985-86). Wisconsin's Corporate Take-Over
Law was amended to apply only to companies (1) having no securities registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or (2) having fifty-one percent of their
stock held by Wisconsin residents; or (3) having at least thirty-three percent of their
stock held by Wisconsin residents, having their principal office in Wisconsin. and
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and Pennsylvania,42 as well as of other states adopting one or
more of their approaches, is to take better advantage of the
"internal affairs" argument by more explicitly involving their
corporate statutes in the takeover process. These four states
each take a different approach to this shared objective, and
each of the statutes is receiving the critical attention of

commentators .43
After describing the operation of the "control share acquisition" approach of Ohio, as modified and adopted in Minne44
sota, the first decision considering Minnesota's approach,
Van Dusen, will be examined. The decision held that Minnesota's approach to state takeover regulation was unconstitutional. Beyond that immediate result, the decision's "burden"
on commerce analysis relied on conclusions about the societal
having business or operation with a substantial economic effect on Wisconsin. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 552.05(7)(a)-(c). Wisconsin amended its corporate statutes to include a
control share acquisition and fair price provision that are somewhat different than
those of Ohio and Maryland. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.69,.725.
42. See 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C)(l)-(3), 1910 (Purdon
Supp. 1985). Pennsylvania's corporate statute was amended to authorize directors
and officers to consider the interests of various noninvestors when determining the
best interests of a Pennsylvania corporation, to restrict voting rights of interested
shareholders in certain transactions such as a merger, and to provide a right of redemption to disinterested shareholders upon a purchaser's acquisition of thirty percent of a corporation's stock.
43. See Krieder, Fortress Without Foundation?Ohio Takeover Act I, 52 U. CIN. L. REv.
108 (1983); Newlin & Gilmer, The Peinsyvania Shareholder Protection Act: A .Vew State
.4pproach to Deflecting Coiporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAw 11 (1984); Profusek &
Gompf, supra note 21, at 20-41; Sargent, supra note 36, at 8-12; Scriggins & Clarke,
Takeovers and the 1983 Alaryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266 (1984); Sell,.4
Critical .- iialysis of a YVew Approach to State Takeover Legislation After .1ITE, 23 WASHBURN
L. J. reprinted in 27 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 95 (1985) (analyzing Pennsylvania Statute);
Warren, supra note 7, at 694-700; Note, Secoid Generation State Takeover Legislation:
.a1Irylmad Takes a Yew Tack, 83 Mien. L. REV. 433 (1984).
The ultimate end of an analysis of these statutes should not be simply to conelude that they are or are not constitutional. Rather, the important question is what
such constitutional analysis implies for the ability of the state to devise any means,
corporate statutes or otherwise, of providing what states perceive as missing from
federal takeover policy-consideration of the importance to noninvestor claimants
on the modern corporation of not having that institution experience severe disruption or being required to operate under an excessive threat of such disruption.
44. Two earlier opinions have also dealt with control share acquisition statutes.
In Ceic Holding Co. v. Cincinnati Equitable Co., No. C-1-84-1587 (S.D. Ohio 1984),
an Ohio federal district court denied a request for a temporary restraining order
against Ohio's statute in a very brief opinion. InJune, 1985, Missouri's control share
acquisition statute was hastily made applicable to certain foregii corporations to aid in
TWA's resistance to Carl Icahn's takeover attempt. It was held that this provision
violated both the commerce and supremacy clauses. Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1417-18,
1420 (W.D.Mo. 1985).
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effects of takeovers that are largely drawn from the now-challenged stock price evidence. Consequently, Van Dusen indicates that other state efforts to regulate takeovers through
corporate statutes may also fail unless a new judicial analysis of
such legislation is adopted.
B.

Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute
1.

Overview of the Statute

Although Minnesota's control share acquisition statute is
modeled after Ohio's, it contains certain significant differences. For example, unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation or in bylaws approved by the shareholders,
45
acquisitions of stock are not subject to Minnesota's statute.
Assuming coverage has been elected, the heart of the statute
is that any "control share acquisition" of an "issuing public
corporation" by an "acquiring person" can be made only with
the prior approval of its shareholders in accordance with specified procedures. 4 6 Shares purchased by an acquiring person
without complying with the statute will be denied voting rights
and will be deemed nontransferable for one year after acquisition. 4 7 Furthermore, during that one year period, the corporation will have the option to call the shares for redemption at
the purchase price. 4 8 The provisions of the statute may be enforced by an acquiring person, the issuing public corporation,
4
or by shareholders of an issuing public corporation. 9
A "control share acquisition" is defined as an acquisition5,
of shares of an "issuing public corporation" 5' that results in an
45. This change to an "opt in" statute from Ohio's "opt out" approach was made
in 1985. See Act of June 24, 1985, ch. 5, § 19, 1985 Minn. Laws 1638.
46. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671, subd. 4 (Supp. 1985).
47. Id., subd. l(b).
48. Id. It is not altogether clear, but presumably the corporation could purchase
less than all of the shares acquired in violation of the statute.
49. Id., subd. 5.
50. Note that offers to purchase are not regulated, only the actual acqiusitiol of
stock. MINN. STAT. § 302A.0 11, subd. 38 (1984). Furthermore, all acquisitionswhether by tender offer, open market purchase, or privately negotiated purchaseare covered, subject to limited exceptions. The most significant of the exceptions are
acquisitions directly from the issuing public corporation (thus preserving the stock
"lock-up" as a defensive tactic) and transactions to which the issuing public corporation has agreed and is itself a party as with a merger, exchange, or sale of substantially all assets. See id.
51. An "issuing public corporation" is defined as (1)being a corporation incorporated under Minnesota law (not foreign corporations. however substantial their
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acquiring person's percentage of voting power in the election
of directors extending into any of the following ranges:
(1) at least 20 percent, but less than 33-1/3 percent;
(2) at least 33-1/3 percent, but less than or equal to 50
percent;
52
(3) over 50 percent.
Acquisitions of stock resulting in a change of ownership
within any of the ranges are not covered, only transactions
leading to movement into one of the ranges. For example, a
change of ownership from twenty-one percent to thirty-two
percent would not be covered, while a change from thirty-two
percent to thirty-four percent would be covered. Thus, some
relatively major purchases will fall outside the statute while
some fairly small purchases will be covered.
,:
53
Any person proposing to make a control share acquisition
is required to deliver to the issuing public corporation an "in54
formation statement" containing specified information.
Among the information to be included in the statement, and
this is central to the legislature's concern about the adverse
5 -5
effects of hostile takeovers on various important interests,
are the terms of the proposed acquisition. Such terms include
any plans to liquidate ("break up") the corporation, change
the location of its principal executive office or a material portion of its business activities, materially alter management or
employment policies or relationships with communities, suppliers or customers, and such other objective facts as would be
substantially likely to affect a shareholder's vote on the pro56
posed control share acquisition..
A special meeting of shareholders of the issuing public corporation must be called within five days after receipt of the information statement for the purpose of voting on the proposed
control share acquisition. 5 7 The meeting must be held no later
Minnesota operations), (2) having at least 50 shareholders (who need not be Minnesota residents), and (3) having either its principal place of business located in Minnesota or which owns or controls assets in Minnesota having a fair market value of at
least $1,000,000. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.01 1, subd. 8, subd. 39 (1984 & Stipp. 1985).
52. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671, subd. 2 (Supp. 1985).
53. Such a person is an "acquiring person." MINN. STAT. § 302A.01 I, subd. 37.
54. Id. § 302A.671, subd. 2.
55. See Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488, 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71.
56. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671, subd. 2(e).
57. Id. § 302A.671, subd. 3.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/1

14

Johnson: Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for Ne
CONTROL SHARE ACQt "ISITIOA"STA TU TE

19861

than fifty-five days after receipt of the information statement,
unless the acquiring person agrees otherwise, and no sooner
than thirty days after receipt if the acquiring person so requests in writing. 58 Notice of the meeting must be given within
5
twenty-five days after receipt of the information statement. 9
The notice must include a copy of the information statement
and a statement by the board of directors of the issuing public
corporation as to its position on the proposed acquisition.(io
To this point, the requirements of the statute are a mere
prologue. The critical element is the vote of shareholders on
the proposed control share acquisition. The acquiring person
may consummate the proposed control share acquisition only
if (1) the acquisition is approved by the affirmative vote of the
holders of a majority of the voting power of all shares entitled
to vote,(" and (2) the proposed control share acquisition is
62
consummated within 180 days after shareholder approval. "
Consequently, the crux of the statute is that a shareholder of
an issuing public corporation cannot act alone in deciding
whether to sell his stock to an acquiring person, but must first
receive the approval of fellow shareholders in the manner
specified.
2.

Rationalefor ShareholderApproval

Essentially, a control share acquisition statute is premised on
the view that a tender offer, or substantial open market or privately negotiated purchase, is but one means of transferring
ownership or control of a corporation's assets."3 Since other
methods of transfer, such as a merger or sale of all or substan58. Id.
59.
60.
neutral
61.

Id.
Id. Target company management must indicate that it favors, opposes, is
toward, or is unable to take a position on the proposed acquisition. Id.
Shares owned by the acquiring person prior to the proposed acquisition may

be voted.

MINN. STAT.

§ 302A.671, subd. 4.

62. Id. A class or series of shares is entitled to vote on the proposed acquisition
as a class or series if any provision of the acquisition would, if contained in a proposed amendment to the articles, entitle the class or series to vote as a class or series.

Id.
63. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids io the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Ltw. 101, 116
(1979); Steinbrink, Managemeit s Responise to the Takeover Attempt. 28 CAsE W. REs. L.
REV. 882, 892 (1978). For a critique of this view to the extent it implies a role for
target company management in tender offers, see Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The Case gaiust Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. .. RE\V. 819, 848-52
(1981).
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tially all corporate assets, usually require shareholder approval, the argument goes, so should a transfer by means of a
stock sale. 6 4 Furthermore, the argument continues, conditioning a transfer of corporate assets on shareholder approval is a
proper exercise of a state's authority to regulate the "internal
affairs" of corporations organized under its laws. 65 While arguments in defense of the statute will be dealt with later,"" several points about such a view of the statute are best made at
this juncture.
First, the analogy to mergers and sales of assets is hardly
perfect since these transactions involve corporate parties,
while tender offers involve only shareholders of the target
company, not the company itself.67 Nonetheless, there is considerable merit to the analogy when it is remembered that
every acquisition of a corporation, whatever its form, has as its
objective the control of corporate assets. Yet in the modern
public corporation, characterized by a separation of ownership
and management, the shareholder-owners have basically relinquished control over corporate assets to hired management.x
This is fine except for what Professor Lowenstein calls one
"small" fact: for historical reasons, nowhere in modern corpo64. See, e.g., Steinbrink, sopra note 63, at 907; see also Comment, sipra note 4, at
888 n.2 0 6 .
65. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 888 n.206.
66. lAfra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
67. Judge Rosenbaum, in Vain Dnsen emphasized this distinction.
'an Dlusel.
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,191-192. He relied on dictum in .J1177'that
begs the issue in Vlan Dse: Is restricting transfer of stock an appropriate exercise of
state authority to regulate corporations? Trying to distinguish things "corporate"
from things "shareholder" in this manner is contrary to corporate reality and ignores
the breadth of corporate statutes. Such statutes not only regulate the corporate entity
itself, they also prescribe rules for its governance system and its capital structure, all
of which involve shareholders. See infia text accompanying notes 102-11.
68. Professor Lowenstein, reaching back to Berle and Means' classic work (A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPIERTN (rev, ed.
1968)), makes this point and develops its implications for takeovers. Lowenstein,
Pruning"Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: .1 Proposalfor Legislation, 83 CotJuM. L. RE'. 249,
259-68 (1983).
Needless to say, the allocation of power in the modern corporation has reduced
the "say" of shareholders in public corporations in a way that is still extremelv troubling for corporate governance. Much writing on corporate takeovers has dealt with
the takeover's purported function in disciplining management on behalf of shareholders and with formulating proper standards of behavior for management facing a
takeover. Little, if anything, has been written about the basic issue of whether
heightened allegience to shareholder interests is the proper objective for corporate
behavior in a takeover.
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rate statutes is it stated that management has the right, as it
does in merger or sale of assets transactions, to prevent third
parties from acquiring corporate assets not by proceeding directly to purchase those assets from the corporation, but by
purchasing corporate stock from the owners and thereby obtaining control over the assets.i1
As indicated, however, it is the assets of the corporation, not
the stock of the shareholders, the acquisition of which is but an
intermediate step in acquiring control of the assets, that the
tender offer phenomenon is all about. As such, there is a
"crack" in modern corporate statutes which allows shareholders, acting without involvement by the board of directors, to
sell corporate assets simply by selling their stock in a tender
offer. In a sense, Minnesota's control share acquisition statute
might be viewed as an attempt to deal with that "crack" by at
least formalizing and subjecting to deliberative, collective
7
shareholder action the decision to transfer corporate assets. 0
Second, Minnesota was clearly concerned about the effects
of takeovers on local economic and social interests, 7 ' yet subjects the fate of those interests to a shareholder vote, thereby
evincing a belief that the "owners" of a corporation must decide whether a tender offer should succeed. On its face, submitting to investors the question of whether a particular
takeover should proceed may appear to be "shareholder democracy" in action, but it is a curious way of trying to protect
noninvestor interests.
Third, it is not clear that shareholders actually care about
the same interests that the Minnesota Legislature was con69. Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 263-64.
70. A more direct approach to accomplishing deliberative corporate action might
be, as with mergers and asset sales, to require board approval of a tender offer.
While this may strike some as too great an infringement on a shareholder's "right" to
alienate his stock, viewing a tender offer as essentially a means of obtaining corporate
assets might logically lead to the participation of management. It is interesting to
note that the "poison pill" defense, recently upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court,
and now being implemented by many corporations, in effect may require third parties seeking control of a corporation to obtain the approval of the target company
board. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. [Current] FED. SEC. L. RI'R. (CCH) 92,371,
at 92,341 (Del. S. Ct. 1985). Thus, that defensive tactic also fills the "crack" in modern corporate statutes.
71. Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488, 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71; Cardif,751 F.2d at
906.
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cerned about. 72 Assuming shareholders care, they may have
no particular inclination or competence to assess how the interests of employees, creditors, and communities should affect
their decisions to sell or hold stock, particularly since their
73
function is to provide capital, not manage corporate affairs.
If they lack such inclination or competence, or if they simply
do not care about such factors in making investment decisions,
is shareholder approval any more than a meaningless, but innocuous requirement? Perhaps there is an unspoken belief
underlying the statute that, notwithstanding the apparent deference to shareholders, the very procedure of submitting a
tender offer for approval will lessen the offer's likelihood of
success by affording target management additional time to implement defensive measures or by simply discouraging an offeror who wishes to consummate a takeover very quickly.
Having that effect, requiring shareholder approval may indeed
serve as a kind of foil for protecting noninvestor interests.
Fourth, it thus becomes clearer that there is a certain irony
to requiring shareholder approval as a means of regulating
takeovers when most stock price evidence shows that takeovers
significantly enhance investor wealth.7 4 In short, notwithstanding formal deference to shareholders, the reality is that
the additional step of seeking their consent may actually harm
shareholders, all to the good, perhaps, of other corporate constituencies. On the other hand, if the whole procedure is simply a means of providing target management additional time to
respond to the takeover offer 75 so that an even higher premium can be obtained for shareholders, and a graceful exit arranged for management, 7 6 then the noninvestor interests cited
72.

See Comment, supra note 4, at 885 & n.191 (authority to the effect that share-

holders might be primarily concerned about the financial aspects of a tender offer).
73. See Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Coiporate Governaice
System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343, 416 (1981) ("even
assuming that shareholders are interested in playing a more meaningful role in corporate affairs, we cannot expect them to control the social aspects of corporate
power").
74. Supra note 13. This is the potential "stifling" or "chilling" effect on tender
offers that many commentators and courts consider undesirable. See, e.g., Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982) Comment, supia
note 4, at 882-86; Note, supra note 43, at 457. As indicated, supra, notes 4 & 5, there
is growing concern about the desirability of an "unstifled" market for corporate
control.
75. Supra note 25.
76. Ultimately, in Cardiff, the offer was increased by seven dollars per share and
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by the legislature are not necessarily protected at all. Reciting
a concern for those interests may have been a screen to accomplish other ends.
These objections reveal the statute's extraordinary ambivalence about its aims and about the proper ends of corporate
behavior. Is the statute aimed at safeguarding shareholders or
at assuring that important noninvestor interests are protected
from hostile takeovers? 7 7 Whoever the intended beneficiaries
of the legislation, regulating takeovers under the guise of governing a corporation's "internal affairs" stretches corporate
statutes to fulfill social policy in a way that inevitably exposes
those statutes to constitutional scrutiny.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONTROL SHARE
ACQUISITION STATUTE

A.

The Van Dusen Decision

The facts of the Van Dusen case are very simple. As of August
2, 1985, APL Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership, had purchased eighteen percent of the stock of Van Dusen Air Inc. on the open market. Van Dusen was an "issuing
public corporation" and APL's purchases placed it just under
the twenty percent range which would trigger operation of the
control share acquisition statute. 78 Rather than comply with
the statute, APL commenced an action seeking a declaration,
inter alia, that the statute violated both the commerce and
supremacy clauses. Judge Rosenbaum held that the statute vi7
olated the commerce clause. 9
Although he somewhat confusingly refers to "direct burdens" on interstate commerce in his opinion,8 0 it is clear that
Judge Rosenbaum did not analyze the statute as a "direct"
the board of Conwed Corp., the target, recommended that shareholders tender their
stock. St. Anthony, Conwed Board Votes to Accept Higher Bid, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
Feb. 9, 1985, at IA, col. 1. One might ask: What happened to the concern for
noninvestor interests "found" by the legislature to suffer in takeovers? See supra note
4.
77. This ambivalence of aim will be discussed again. Ia notes 112-13 and accompanying text. An issue that will continue to remain central to all discussions of
corporate law is that of determining what we expect of, and how we even talk about,
the modern corporate institution. See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 1416.
78. MINN. STAT. § 302A.0 11, subd. 38; Id. § 302A.67 1,subd. 1.
79. As a result, Judge Rosenbaum did not address the supremacy clause claim.
Van Dusen, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,193 n.7.
80. Id. at 91,192-193.
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burden on commerce, but rather applied a balancing test
under which the legislation's burden on interstate commerce is
weighed against the local benefits of regulation.," Using the
balancing test, Judge Rosenbaum held that the control share
acquisition statute imposed substantial burdens on interstate
commerce that were excessive in relation to the local benefits.x

"

By restricting the right of nonresidents to purchase and

sell stock in Minnesota corporations, he found the control
share statute to have the same effects on interstate commerce
as the Illinois statute struck down in MITE. Those effects are:
(1) "preventing VDAI [Van Dusen Air Inc., the target company] shareholders from receiving a premium for their
stock;" 8 3 (2) "insulating incumbent management by making
control share acquisitions more difficult thereby reducing the
incentive for incumbent management to perform well; ' '84 and
(3) impeding "the reallocation of economic resources. - 5
81. The distinction between the "direct" and "indirect" analysis is best seen in
language from two Supreme Court opinions. Compare Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co.,
268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) ("[A] state statute which by its necessary operation directly
interferes with or burdens such [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation and
invalid, regardless of the piopose with which it was enacted") (emphasis added) iitlh Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the biideil imposed on such
commerce is clearlv excessive in relation to the putative local blefits ") (emphasis added).
Thus, if a state statute directly burdens commerce, the purpose for doing so. however good, is irrelevant. The direct-indirect distinction in commerce clause analysis
has been criticized as "misleadingly precise," L. IRIBE, AMERICAN CONSrrtrONAI.
LAW § 6-5, at 326 (1978), and as "masking the important policy question: To what
extent does the state regulation actually impede interstate commerce, and what are
the state justifications for so doing?" Sargent, supra note 36, at 14.
In ITE, the direct-indirect distinction was referred to, but only four Justices
found the Illinois Statute to be a direct restraint on commerce while five Justices
found the statute to fail the balancing test of Pike. The arguments advanced byJustice White in finding the Illinois Statute to be a direct restraint on commerce apply as
well to a merger of corporations governed by the corporate law of a state other than
the state in which shareholders reside. Certainly state corporate regulation of such a
merger (across state lines, having shareholders in several states, and utilizing the
facilities of interstate commerce) is not thereby a direct restraint on interstate commerce. In spite of being subject to criticism, the direct-indirect distinction retains
vitality. Nonetheless, only the balancing test of Pike is able to capture the complex
economic and political issues raised by state takeover regulation. But see Icahn, 612 F.
Supp. at 1415 (Missouri control share acquisition statute covering foreign corporations is a direct restraint on commerce).
82. Van Dusen, [Currenti FED. SEC. L. REm'. (CCH) at 91,192-193.
83. Id. at 92,192.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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The outcome in Van Dusen reveals the almost certain fate of
the control share acquisition approach to takeover regulation
given the commerce clause analysis of state takeover legislation employed in MITE and followed in later decisions. The
commerce clause analysis of MITE, Van Dusen, and other decisions has uncritically adopted the efficiency claims for take86
overs made by proponents of the stock price evidence.
B.

The Stock Price Premium Argument

All of the purported effects on interstate commerce cited in
Van Dusen are drawn directly from MITE and, like MITE, Van
Dusen assumes that the statute under review actually has those
effects and that they are objectionable. 8 7 The basis for this
conclusion in MITE, and hence in Van Dusen, is the reasoning
of certain proponents of the "efficient capital market" hypothesis and several studies showing significant stock price increases resulting from takeovers. 88 The relationship among
the efficient capital market hypothesis, stock price movements
in takeovers, and the efficiency implications of takeovers has
been described as follows:
In fact, the stock price change is the best measure of the
takeover's future impact on the organization. The vast scientific evidence on the theory of efficient markets indicates
that, in the absence of inside information, a security's market price represents the best available estimate of its true
value. The evidence shows that market prices incorporate
all current public information about future cash flows and
the value of individual assets in an unbiased way. Stock
prices change, of course, in response to new information
about individual assets. Because market prices are efficient,
however, the new information is equally likely to cause
them to decrease or increase, after allowing for normal returns. Positive stock price changes then, indicate a rise in the total
profitability of the merged companies. Furthermore, because evidence indicates it does not come from the acquisition of
market power, this increased profitability must be from the com86. See supra note 13.
87. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; see also supra, text accompanying note 16. Ian

Dusen, [Current]

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

(CCH) at 92,192.

88. For a useful collection of materials on the efficient capital market hypothesis,

see R.

HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE

185-212 (1984).

Evidence suggesting a

need to modify the hypothesis is increasing. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, .-IgenV
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1425 n.55 (1985).
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pany's improved productivity.8 9
In short, since capital markets are assumed to be efficient,
the market price of a target company's stock will reflect management's competence in utilizing corporate assets. A stock
price that is depressed in comparison to underlying asset value
reflects poor management and the misuse of available resources. A premium offer, above the market price, signifies
that the offeror will utilize corporate assets more efficiently and
profitably than incumbent management. Such an outcome, the
argument goes, is advantageous to shareholders who receive a
premium and is advantageous to society which obtains a better
use of scarce resources.
Proponents of this theory have examined stock price movements in completed takeovers and found substantial increases
in target company prices and lesser increases in acquiring company prices. As a result, they have concluded that, consistent
with theory, takeovers serve the commendable functions of
providing shareholders with premiums, disciplining inefficient
management, and redeploying economic resources.90
C. A Reevaluation of the Efficiency Theory of Takeovers
The line of reasoning adopted in MITE and Van Dusen depends critically on the assumption that, consistent with the efficient capital market hypothesis, the stock price evidence is
precisely what the 1985 Economic Report claimed it to be-"a
reliable barometer of the likely consequences of takeover
transactions.' ''I Recent anecdotal 92 and empirical evidence
raises serious doubts about this assumption and the resulting
conclusion that corporate acquisitions typically lead to more
productive, efficient businesses. In short, such evidence suggests that the existence of stock price increases and wealth
gains for shareholders may not necessarily indicate efficiency
gains from corporate combinations.
89. Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. RE%'. 109, 113 (Nov.-Dec.
1984) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 12. See also Jarrell &
Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal amd State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L.
& EcoN. 371, 380-81 (1980).
90. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
91. 1985 Economic Report, supra note 12, at 197.
92. See Do Mergers Really I'ork?. Bus. WK., June 3, 1985, at 88.
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Professor F.M. Scherer and Mr. David Ravenscraft 0 3 have assembled substantial direct evidence on mergers showing that
acquired companies during the 1960's and early 1970's were,
on average, highly profitable before being acquired and that,
after being acquired, often exprienced a decline in profitability.'94 In addition, Professors Herman and Lowenstein, having
examined fifty-six hostile tender offers initiated between 1975
and 1983, found a significant decline in the acquired company's post-merger financial performance, and conclude that
hostile takeovers do not necessarily lead to efficiency gains.9 5
These studies, along with post-aquisition market share declines observed by Professor Mueller, 96 raise substantial
doubts as to whether only inefficiently managed companies are
acquisition targets. They also raise a serious question as to
whether acquirers are serving larger societal interests by seeking to buy attractive targets and then, for whatever reasons,
perhaps mismanaging or "breaking up" what may have been
97
well-run businesses.
93. Professor Scherer is a Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College and
Mr. Ravenscraft is with the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
94. See generally D. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, The Profitability of Veigers (Dec.,
1985)(working paper)(copy on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). The findings of Ravenscraft and Scherer are expected to be published in 1986. Ravenscraft
and Scherer examined more than five thousand mergers and acquisitions of all kinds
covering a twenty-seven year period, utilizing data from the FTC's "Line of Business" survey. They conclude that their findings are "difficult to reconcile with the
conjecture that mergers turned out on average to be profit-increasing and efficiencyenhancing" and suggest that present efficiency claims for mergers should be "accorded appropriate skepticism." Id at 34, 37. While the Ravenscraft-Scherer findings run counter to the claims of those who rely on stock price evidence, they are in
line with much earlier work which also found few efficiency gains from mergers.
95. See Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers: An
Empirical Study (a study in proceedings of Columbia University's Center for Law and
Economic Studies' Conference on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control)
19-26 (Nov., 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
96. See Mueller, .Veigers and .MarketShare. 67 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 259 (1985) (substantial 1950-72 declines in market share experienced by acquired businesses as coinpared to control group companies).
97. Professor Scherer recently criticized the stock price evidence and the claims
made for its takeover implications by, for example, the 1985 Economic Report. At
the same time he also raised the possibility that "it is the stock market, not management of the target firm, which has erred and needs disciplining." lleaing- Befoie the
Iouse Comm. on Eneiy and Commerce, and the Sbnon. on 7elecommnications. Consumner
Protection, and Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 4 (1985) (testimony of' Prof. F.M.
Scherer) (copy on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Even ProfessorJensen,
a well-known defender of takeovers, has acknowledged some problems with the available stock price evidence:
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Evidence of the type gathered by these recent studies has
potentially profound implications for both corporate governance and the commerce clause analysis of state takeover regulation. First, since it appears that many companies which
experienced stock price increases when purchased were not
poorly managed prior to acquisition, depressed stock prices
may not reflect a governance or efficiency "problem" that
needs remedying, or at least one that will necessarily be remedied through a change in control. 98 Indeed, post-acquisition
evidence, empirical and anecdotal, indicates that certain corporations may fare more poorly after being acquired. Second,
if the less efficient use of corporate resources is not a social
good to be encouraged, the claim that takeovers are good for
shareholder wealth, good for corporate governance, and good
for society at large may not be true.9 9 While takeovers may
undeniably be good for selling shareholders who obtain premiums, they do not necessarily serve a meaningful governance
function, do not necessarily serve society's interest in moving
resources to more efficient uses, and do not necessarily serve
local or other noninvestor interests that may be adversely affected by the less efficient, but altered, utilization of a corporation's resources. As such, a pro-takeover stance rooted in the
stock price evidence may be unable to claim advancement of
society's efficiency concerns as a defense of takeovers and as a
reason for opposing their regulation. Instead, such a position
may have to rest on shareholder gains; specifically, monetary
gains obtained through the payment of premiums, not necessarily the addition of a beneficial governance mechanism.
In light of the Ravenscraft-Scherer and Herman-Lowenstein
findings, the reliance of MITE and Van Dusen on the efficiency
theory of hostile takeovers for their "burden" on commerce
clause analysis may be misplaced. If stock price evidence is not
a "reliable barometer" of efficiency outcomes, then, in effect,
Minnesota's statute has a deleterious effect on interestate com. . . Several studies show indications of systematic reductions in the stock
prices of bidding firms in the year following the event. These post-outcome
negative abnormal returns are unsettling because they are inconsistent with
market efficiency and suggest that changes in stock price during takeovers
overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers . . . . Explanation of
these post-event negative abnormal returns is currently an unsettled issue.
Jensen & Ruback, supra note 13, at 20-22.
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 16, 83-85 and accompanying text.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/1
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merce simply because of potential premium losses to shareholders. That is a considerably less substantial effect than
those posited in MITE and Van Dusen and raises the question of
whether such an effect is a "burden" on commerce "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits . . . ,,1oo This

question requires
legislation.
D.

consideration

of the benefits

of the

The Benefits of Minnesota's Legislation
1.

Shareholder Protection

Against the claimed burden on commerce, Minnesota advanced the benefits of the control share acquisition statute as
being (1) the protection of shareholders in Minnesota corporations, and (2) the protection of the state's business climate. In
addition, the state defended the statute as a valid exercise of a
state's authority to regulate the "internal affairs" of corporations formed under its laws.
The first argument was quickly disposed of by Judge Rosenbaum as legitimate in the abstract, but not thereby authorizing
"protection" of nonresident shareholders as was the effect of
Minnesota's statute.' 0 The state's defense of the statute as
benefiting shareholders is somewhat ironic. In the name of
protecting shareholders, the question of whether shareholders
may sell their stock must be submitted to a shareholder vote
even though doing so may deter or even thwart a takeover proposal offering a significant premium. In spite of this, there is a
very real sense in which Minnesota shareholders of a Minnesota corporation might be protected by the statute's applicability to nonresident transactions.
Recall that a takeover, while cast in the form of a stock acquisition, is ultimately aimed at obtaining control over corporate
assets and, perhaps, redeploying them. A Minnesota resident
who does not wish to tender stock because he agrees with present corporate policies and/or thinks the offer price is too low,
yet who does not want to remain a shareholder in a possibly
restructured company or be "squeezed out" later, faces a ma100. This is the balancing test of Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
101. See Van Dusen, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,191. For example, the
proposed sale of stock in a Minnesota corporation by a California resident to a New
York resident, if a "control share acquisition," would be governed by the Minnesota
statute. See MINN. STA-r. § 302A.01 1, subd. 38-39.
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jor change in his investment. Is his only choice to tender or
hold or, confronted with an event that may fundamentally alter
his investment to the same extent as a merger or asset sale,
should he also be entitled to vote on whether the transaction
will even take place? Minnesota might persuasively claim to
have an interest in providing resident investors with a voice in
potentially major changes in management or fundamental corporate policy.' 0 2 While this argument might be more convincing if confined to situations where Minnesota residents owned
sufficient stock to block a change in control, the point is that
Minnesota has an interest in providing its residents with a
voice in control contests, not simply in assuring them a veto
0 3

power.1

Moreover, since coverage under the statute is elective by
shareholder action, such an election might represent a desire
by shareholders to act in a more coordinated, collective manner when presented with an offer. In effect, the statute
amounts to a pact among shareholders that none can sell unless a majority approves. Each shareholder grants fellow
shareholders the right to disapprove a proposed transfer in exchange for obtaining the right to disapprove proposed transfers by fellow shareholders. One possible reason for giving up
the right to make stock disposition decisions is the belief that
individual shareholders are unable to negotiate with an offeror
and that the requirement of deliberative shareholder approval
may ultimately lead to a better offer. Whether bargaining away
rights in this manner is prudent for the individual shareholder
is unknown, but presumably that decision would be made at
the time coverage under the statute is voted on.
2.

Protection of Other Interests

There is still another argument in defense of the statute, one
that gets closer to an important aim of the legislation. Rather
than defending the statute as an effort to "protect" shareholders, it might be defended in exactly the opposite manner-as a
102. This argument focuses on protecting shareholders who do not want a change
in management or corporate policy at the expense of preventing other shareholders
from selling their stock and departing from the corporation. For another argument
that the statute protects resident investors, see infra notes 12 1-23 and accompanying
text.
103. Perhaps the statute should, however, require a minimum level of stock ownership-e.g., 10O%-by Minnesota residents to make this argument meaningfil.
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limitation on shareholders imposed to further other interests.
The question then becomes whether shareholders, wherever
they reside, have an absolute "right" to sell their stock in interstate transactions unhindered by the laws of the state under
which the issuing corporation is organized. If that "right" is
assumed to unalterably exist in some pristine condition, then a
control share acquisition statute, which limits that "right" in an
effort to protect noninvestor interests, 0 4 is improper "regulation" of interstate stock transfers. This is true because, by definition, stock is inherently transferable without approval by
fellow shareholders.
The issue, however, is whether the state under which the issuing corporation was organized may itself determine the nature and attendant rights of that species of property called
corporate stock. Specifically, just as state corporate law may
define a share of corporate stock by conferring on it just one
vote, 0 5 certain inspection rights, 10 6 and otherwise giving it
content, may that law not also delimit stock by allowing its
transfer only upon compliance with certain procedures? Provided the restrictions are reasonable, state law has long allowed prohibitions on "free" transferability of stock. 10 7 The
fact that such traditional share transfer restrictions are contained in articles, bylaws, or shareholder agreements, rather
than directly imposed by corporate statute as is a control share
acquisiton provision, does not detract from the point that state
law often constitutionally defines and "regulates" stock and its
transfer. Corporate statutes do not simply regulate the entity
itself, but prescribe the governance relationships within the
corporation and the nature and extent of the shareholders'
claim on the corporation. Furthermore, if the control share
provision is optional rather than mandatory, as in Minnesota,
the distinction from other share transfer restriction provisions
is eliminated. 0 8
104. See, e.g., 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71.
105. MINN. STAT. § 302A.445, subd. 3.
106. Id. § 302A.461.
107. It could hardly be contended that a corporate statute allowing restrictions on
transferability-e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.429-is a burden on interstate commerce
because it might lead to the requirement of certain approvals for transferring stock in
a Minnesota corporation from a Florida resident to a California resident.
92,371, a section of Dela108. In Voran, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ware's corporate statute pursuant to which a "poison pill" rights plan had been enacted by the Household board of directors was challenged on commerce and
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While the reasons for more traditional share transfer restrictions-e.g., maintaining share ownership among a limited
number of business associates-may be absent in the publicly
held corporation, there may be other, equally compelling reasons for restricting transfer. For example, given modern business needs and the allocation of responsibility between
management and investors, it might be argued that shareholders' "collective capital ought to be committed indefinitely"'' 0 9
to the enterprise. If shareholders desire liquidity, it may be
sought in the trading market, rather than through an en masse
transfer of stock to a buyer seeking access to corporate assets.
A tender offer gives shareholders the right not only to liquidate their stock, but also to sell corporate assets without management approval. That "right" may alter the desired
allocation of power between management and shareholders
"because it gives to investors with a characteristically shortterm focus the power to turn the assets into cash without notice.""t 0 Such a reallocation of control over corporate assets
from management to shareholders may, and often does, have
"seriously disruptive consequences" for the business itself and
for those dependent on the corporation.I'
supremacy clause grounds under MITE. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected that
argument, stating that it did "not read the analysis in Edgar as applicable to the actions of private parties. The fact that directors of a corporation act pursuant to a
state statute provides an insufficient nexus to the state for there to be state action
which may violate the Commerce Clause or Supremacy Clause." Id. at 92,344. Likewise, electing coverage under a control share acquisition statute would seem to be
"private" action notwithstanding the fact that such action adopts a ready-made, statedrawn provision.
109. Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 259.
110. Id. at 262.
Il1. The phrase is Professor Lowenstein's. Id. For a sampling of concerns about
the feverish takeover activity which results from "free dealing" in corporations by
shareholder transfers of stock, see supra note 5.
One concern in particular has received considerable attention-the increased
use of debt, both to finance takeovers and to defend against them as with a leveraged
buy-out or repurchase of stock. Heavy debt may significantly weaken a business, as
has happened to many combatants in takeover battles (e.g., Martin Marietta, CBS,
Phillips Petroleum). See Rohatyn,Jmnk Bonds and Other Securities Swill, Wall St. J., Apr.
18, 1985, at 28, col. 1 (describing dangers of excessive debt, including the effects on
employees and communities of a corporation having to sell off assets to service debt).
Another concern is the defensive measure of selling substantial assets to render
a target unattractive-the "crown jewels" tactic. A recent example is Union Carbide's plan to sell its consumer products division. Carbide's Chairman has admitted
the tactic is destructive. "I don't think it's good for the country and I don't think it's
good for Carbide." Isikoff& Vise, Carbide Plans Sale of Unit As Defense, Wash. Post,Jan.
3, 1986, at Al, col. I, A8, col. i. The planned sale has also alarmed attorneys who
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Much the same argument can be made under the "internal
affairs" doctrine, a defense of the statute that was also made by
the State of Minnesota and rejected in Van Dusen. While it
might be said, as Judge Rosenbaum did in Van Dusen, that a
control share acquisition statute does not govern internal corporate affairs, only transfers by shareholders, the issue is whether
state law can define stock rights so that the question of transfer
of stock (and thus, possibly, of an entire corporation) is not
solely between the proposed seller and buyer, but requires
other action as well. A state may be reluctant to defend takeover legislation in this manner-i.e., as limiting shareholder
rights-rather than, as is often the case, advancing such legislation as protecting investors. Nonetheless, such a defense has
certain advantages. First, it is closer to the truth of what is being done; namely, limiting shareholder rights in aid of other
goals. Second, such honesty requires the statute's defenders
to confront the ambivalence noted eariler. 2 Perhaps the potential adverseness of investor and noninvestor interests in a
takeover should be acknowledged, rather than insincerely arguing that the statute is good for investors and others alike.
Investors often desire the resulting premiums, while little is
known about how other interests fare." 3 Admittedly, put that
way, a control share acquisition statute may be a strange creature in subjecting an investor's right to obtain a takeover premium to the consent of other investors, all to protect
noninvestor interests.
Third, however, odd the manner of regulation, honesty as to
what interests are being protected focuses the constitutional
question more clearly. The issue is not simply whether a state
can "reach out" to regulate stock transfers outside its borders
(as though once physically out of the state of incorporation the
represent Bhopal tort victims. Id. At the same time, the struggle with GAF Corp. has
been described as "a boon for shareholders" because the quasi-liquidation and
threatened takeover have sent Carbide's stock price soaring. Stewart & Hertzberg,
CarbideHolders Are Clear-Cut Victors In Battle to Thwart GAF Takeover Bid, Wall St. J., Jan.
6, 1986, at 2, col. 3. Thus, what is good for investors in a corporation may not be
good for other persons and groups in society. Such "inconvenient" facts are not
easily accommodated in the simple economic models of many takeover proponents.
112. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. The state and target company
management have raised, but not resolved, the question of whether the statute is
designed to protect noninvestor interests or whether reciting such interests is simply
a foil to gain time for management to better serve its own or investor interests.
113. See supra note 19.
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stock is presumptively "free" of regulation).' "4 Rather, having
identified what it perceives as significant costs of struggles for
corporate control,' '5 may the State of Minnesota act on that
concern by restricting the rights content of stock issued by
Minnesota corporations? Specifically, can the transfer of such
stock be conditioned on receiving consents in addition to the
consent of its holder?
In short, a control share acquisition statute, while defensible
as a legitimate means of protecting a state's investors, ultimately rests more honestly and securely on a state's ability to
determine that corporations formed under its laws, and having
a significant presence in the state (and thus an important impact on its residents), do not exist solely to attract premiums
for investors, but may also serve noninvestor interests even if
doing so is detrimental to investors. That leads to Minnesota's
final defense of the statute.
3.

Protecting Minnesota's Business Climate

The state claimed that the statute helps protect Minnesota's
business climate."t 6 Judge Rosenbaum responded to this defense in two ways. First, he suggested that it was a "questionable assumption that a person who acquires 20% of the voting
stock of a corporation

. .

.

is likely to engage in activity that is

deleterious to Minnesota's business climate, such as moving
the corporate headquarters or base of operations outside of
Minnesota."" 7 While that statement is literally true as to any
particular acquirer, even the 1985 Economic Report acknowledges that public policy "should not, however, be based on the
outcomes of individual transactions .

.

.

. Public policy there-

fore must be based on aggregate trends describing the consequences of takeovers as a whole."' 118 There is indeed great
114. Former SEC Commissioner, A. A. Sommer. Jr., has pointed out the implications of asserting that state law must yield-i.e., cannot "reach out"--because tender
offers take place in a national, interstate market. "The justification, that tender offers
take place in a 'national securities market,' could be used to justify a range of federal
regulation of corporations' internal affairs that is all but limitless. Virtually ever%thing of any moment that a publicly held company does affects its stock and 'transactions that take place in a national securities market.' " Sommer, Whatever Happened to
State La'?. 16 REV. SEC. REG. 833, 839 (1983).
115. 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71.
116. Van Dusen, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,191.
117. Id.
118. See 1985 Economic Report, supra note 12, at 196.
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concern over the aggregate consequences of frequent takeover
activity.'' !' Particularly disturbing are the increasingly common "bust-up" takeovers in which an acquisition is financed by
selling off pieces of the acquired company and the practice of
burdening corporations with substantial debt, either as a result
of, or to ward off a takeover. Although the frequency and consequences of these trends are not subject to precise measurement or statistical verification, the concerns are very real and
are the proper subject of public policy.
Moreover, Judge Rosenbaum's response ignores one of the
major problems in the takeover debate-the lack of conclusive
evidence as to whether, overall, important noninvestor interests are served or damaged by widespread takeover activity.
While many concerns about excessive takeover activity have
been expressed, it is not authoritatively known that takeovers
2
are adverse to important state and national interests. 1 0
Neither, however, is it conclusively known that rapid, costly
transfers of corporate control are beneficial to the entire field
of relationships in which a corporation is involved.121 Until
more decisive evidence is obtained on the implications of take119. See supra notes 5, 6, and I11.
120. The important findings of the Ravenscraft-Scherer and Herman-Low enstein
studies certainly suggest this as to efficiency considerations, however. See sipra notes
94-95.
12 1. Proponents of the stock price evidence have made that claim, but it has been
seriously challenged by more direct evidence. Furthermore, even the SEC's Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers could not conclude that takeovers are beneficial or det-

rimental to the economy. See SEC

ADVISORY REPORT,

supra note 19, at xvii. The need

to resolve that basic question is increasingly being recognized:
[A]s indicated above, the Advisory Committee found that it could not conclude that tender offers were either good or bad for the economy or securities markets or for issuers or their shareholders. With that foundation, the
Advisory Committee went on to conclude that takeovers and related activities are a "valid method of capital allocation" so long as they are conducted
fairly and that they should be neither promoted nor deterred by the regulatory scheme. We think it is important that further efforts be made to resolve
the fundamental question on which the Advisory Committee found itself unable to reach a conclusion.
Letter from American Bar Ass'n Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
to Hon. Timothy Wirth, Mar. 12, 1984 (quoted in A. B. A., SECTION OF CORP., BANKING AND BUSINESS LAw, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, at 14 (Feb. 1985))
(on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office). Congressman Wirth has acknowledged the lack of conclusive answers on the takeover phenomenon:
I am willing to revisit the question-which the SEC and the Administration
apparently feel they have sufficiently put to rest-of whether hostile takeovers are good or bad and whether they should be permitted at all. Too
many thoughtful leaders of the business community have suggested the
harmful impact of takeovers for me to accept without question the SEC's
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overs for such concerns and interests, public policy might prudently seek to deter a phenomenon not fully understood or
easily assessed. Such caution is especially tolerable, and sensible, when it is recalled that the "burden" of such policy on
interstate commerce may not result in any great loss of efficiency in the redeployment of economic resources, but merely
in the denial of shareholder premiums.
Judge Rosenbaum's second response to Minnesota's "business climate" argument was that the business climate was not
protected because the statute does not assure a corporation's
continued presence in the state.1'2 2 That is, Van Dusen Air, as
with any target company, remains at liberty to move out of
Minnesota at any time, free of Minnesota's interference.
Judge Rosenbaum's concern might be answered in the following manner: transactions for control of significant corporations are taking place with increasing frequency and, once
undertaken, proceed with great speed. Responsibility for directing corporate activities has been allocated to the board of
3 There is a need for management to respond to a
directors. 12
takeover attempt in a deliberative, informed manner.124 A response of this type requires time. The control share acquisition statute, while ultimately referring to shareholders the fate
of the proposed takeover provides, in the interim and as an
additional benefit, much needed time for management to formulate a response to the offer. This time might be utilized by
management, the group having the most information about a
target company's affairs, to serve as a bargaining agent for
shareholders seeking a higher price through an "auction" of
conclusion that tender offers are invariably a "valid method of capital
allocation."
Letter from Hon. Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Fin., to Paul H. Elicker, Chairman of the Corporate
Fin., Management and Competition Comm. of the Nat'l Ass'n of Manuf., Oct. 1,
1984, at 5 (quoted in A. B. A. SECTION OF CORP., BANKING AND BUSINESS Lw. REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, at 14-15).

122. Van Dusen [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,191.
123. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subd. 1. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 68,
at 259-62. Courts have consistently upheld board action in response to hostile takeover attempts. See Voran. [Current] FED. SEC. I. REP. (CCH) at 92,347 (collecting
cases). But see, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92, 333 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1985), ajfd., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,357 (Del. 1985).
124. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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the company,' 2 5 or might be used to preserve the company as
an independent entity in a manner determined by target management. 12 "3 Although the statute does not directly tie a corporation to Minnesota, the state might trust that management, if
given sufficient time to respond to a takeover attempt in a
manner consistent with the demands of its fiduciary position,
will retain a sense of obligation to the business and to those
dependent on it. As a result, the additional time will allow
consideration of the various interests Minnesota was con12 7
cerned about in enacting the statute.
There is something to be said for this position only if one
believes three things: that corporations facing takeovers
should respond in a socially responsible manner, not simply
for investor gain; that management is the appropriate mechanism for producing such behavior; and that providing time for
corporate management to react to a takeover attempt is a necessary condition for such behavior. While these propositions
go to the very heart of management-shareholder relations
and raise difficult questions about the proper aims of corporate
behavior, a state might well believe that in making business decisions senior management of socially and economically significant corporations should and will consider a variety of
interests. Specifically, that management will view its obligations as extending to others than just shareholders and, therefore, in Professor White's terminology, seek to behave as good
125. Some commentators have proposed that the appropriate management response to a takeover is to, in effect, initiate an "auction" for the target. See Weiss,
Economic Analysis, Coiporate Law, and the ALl Cotporate Governance Project, 70 CORNE.t. L.
REV. 1, 26-32 (1984). See also, Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 322-23. That is a controversial position, not shared by this author. This contention presumes that control
contests are beneficial for society or, if not, that corporations should be managed to
provide premiums for investors. Nonetheless, the position presupposes sufficient
time for management to successfully adopt the auction strategy. Moreover, it is another argument that the statute, by introducing delay, is beneficial for shareholders.
126. This is consistent with the prevailing judicial view of management's fiduciary
duty in a takeover-i.e., that management is to act in the best interests of the "company," not just for shareholders, and that doing so may entail acting to consider "all
corporate constituencies." This point was made very clear in the Chancery Court
opinion in Moran: "[Defensive] actions by a target board, if taken to protect all corporate constituencies . . . have been consistently approved under the business judgment rule." Moran, 490 A.2d at 1079. As indicated, the interests of shareholders and
noninvestors may diverge rather than coincide. Thus, the question of what interests
management ought to serve in a takeover is a central concern for corporate governance. See infra note I11.
127. See 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71.
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corporate "citizens." ' 2-' Holding this belief, that other interests should and would be considered by management in fulfilling its legal and perhaps ethical duties, does not necessarily
mean that Minnesota wanted to prevent corporations from
making their own economic decisions. Indeed, the State of
Minnesota would surely be wrong to believe that it is in a better position to decide what is good for Van Dusen Air or any
other corporation than its management. Minnesota legislators
might simply believe that if corporate decisionmakers are expected to behave responsibly and to take adequate account of
the diverse claims on the target company, then they need sufficient time to formulate a response to a takeover offer.
In effect, Minnesota might have strongly argued that it legislated not to favor management as an end in itself, but as a
means for allowing management consideration of the noninvestor interests the state thought important in corporate decisionmaking. Without question, such discretion might be exercised
in a manner that serves only management interests or even investor interests, rather than the other noninvestor interests
Minnesota also believed to have valid claims on corporations.
Such uncertainty of exercise does not make the hoped-for benefits "speculative,"'' 2 9 but is the inevitable risk of discretion,
whether reposed in corporate management or in any other
decisionmaker. The uncertainty can be eliminated only by
abolishing discretion and by requiring unswerving allegiance
to just one set of claimants on a corporation.
E.

The Federal Policy of Neutrality

Does such a defense of the control share acquisition statute
against commerce clause attack make the statute vulnerable
under the supremacy clause because it conflicts with the federal policy of investor protection and neutrality between target
and offeror?13 11 If so, then states are constitutionally disabled
128. See White, supra note 8, at 1418 (suggesting language of "citizenship" as
more appropriate for discussing corporate behavior than a language of economics).
129. I'an Dusen [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,192.
130. Judge Rosenbaum did not reach the preemption issue. The primary federal
law dealing specifically with takeovers, the Williams Act, has as its aim the protection
of shareholders. The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e)
and 78n(d)-(I), added new §§ 13(d), 13(e), and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. In enacting the Williams Act, "it is also crystal clear that a major aspect
of the [congressional] effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either man-
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from preserving for corporate management the necessary discretion to do more than remain passive during a takeover by
seeking to make corporate decisions acknowledging the importance of the corporation to a wide variety of interests in the
state. The policy of neutrality would lead, under this reasoning, to an attack on any state law having the effect of diminishing the likelihood of a takeover as constitutionally deficient
because, by delaying the takeover process to enable management to formulate a response that takes account of noninvestor interests, management might not protect those interests' 3 '
or might exercise its discretion to protect noninvestor interests
as a mere pretense for protecting its own interests. In either
case, the ability to influence the outcome of the takeover will
have been "tilted" in management's favor. Thus, any state
corporate laws that enable management to prevent out-of-state
shareholders from obtaining premiums and allow management
to avoid being replaced by the highest bidder, which unquestionably are risks in granting management the discretion to be
a "trustee"'' 32 or to behave as a good "citizen,"'' 3 3 becomes
constitutionally infirm simply because the Williams Act cannot
abide management discretion which, however necessary to
protect noninvestor interests, might also favor its holder.
Here it is well to remember Justice Powell's opinion that the
agement or the takeover bidder." 111TE, 457 U.S. at 633. This is the so-called "policy of neutrality." Id. Although it is clear that Congress adopted a policy of
neutrality, it has been suggested that this was due to a lack of agreement on how to
protect shareholders. Boehm, supra note 18, at 749-50.
The four tests of preemption are: (1) express congressional intent to exclude
state regulation; see, e.g., Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947);
(2) implied congressional intent to exclude state regulation because of the pervasive
scheme of federal regulation; see, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc..
411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973); (3) direct conflict between federal and state regulatory
schemes so that compliance with both is physically impossible; see, e.g., Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); or (4) state regulation
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
It does not appear that Congress sought expressly or implicitly to prohibit state
regulation of tender offers. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. Also, it is not impossible to
comply with both Minnesota's statute and federal provisions. The preemption issue
is thus whether the statute frustrates the Williams Act objectives in some substantial
way.
131. Judge Rosenbaum raised the possibility that Van Dusen Air might abandon
Minnesota. See Van Dusen, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP,. (CCH) at 92,191.
132. Dodd, For ll'hont Are Copporate Vanagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145
(1932). The term is Professor Dodd's.
133. White, supra note 8, at 1418. The term is Professor White's.
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federal policy of neutrality does not necesarily prohibit state
legislation to protect noninvestor interests that "include but
' 13 4
often are broader than those of incumbent management."
In other words, preserving to management the discretion to
protect noninvestor interests by resisting a takeover may not
make state takeover legislation infirm, injustice Powell's view,
simply because it may also serve management interests.13 5 As
has been indicated, it may be that in many takeovers noninvestor interests are more closely aligned with those of management than those of investors. Thus, neutralizing the interests
of target company management may sterilize the primary decision-making mechanism of the corporation so that it cannot
take account of any but investor claims on the corporation's
future. In short, management simply shuts down while shareholders, who may depart from the corporation, and the "market" decide the fate of all others. Obviously, this reflects either
a remarkable belief that the interests of investors and others
generally coincide-an increasingly dubious conclusion-or
simply a belief that corporations faced with a takeover are to be
managed purely for investors.
While the policy of neutrality makes sense in a three person
world of offeror, shareholder, and target management, it is capable of being made wholly insensitive to the fact that corporations, and contests for their control, substantially affect the
lives of others. In addition, the policy is easier to accept if,
again, one believes that the often cited stock price evidence is a
good "barometer" of the social utility of takeovers. Then, the
interests displaced by a takeover in, for example, Minnesota,
are one cost of a realignment of resources that, on balance, is
good for most interests in society. If, however, that claim for
stock price evidence is challenged as untrue or as simply open
to serious question as is the import of the Ravenscraft-Scherer
and Herman-Lowenstein findings, then the federal policy of
neutrality, seeking as it does the protection of shareholders
134. MITE, 457 U.S. at 647 (Powell,J., concurring). The upreme Court in .ITE
did not hold the Illinois takeover statute to be preempted by the Williams Act. Only
Justices White, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Berger reached that conclusion.
135. Id. This view should also be remembered, and may be significant to later
Supreme Court review of corporate statutes regulating takeovers, as the factors to be
balanced in commerce clause analysis are reassessed. The "burden" of these statutes
lightened to be primarily the loss of premiums by investors while the probable benefits of deterring excessive takeover activity receive more attention.
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who benefit by takeover-produced premiums, is not necessarily
good for most other interests. Such a policy may take inadequate account of the ramifications of corporate behavior for
various interests in society. Read too restrictively, the policy
may do more than achieve neutrality between bidder and target management. It may also prevent states from deploying
corporate management as the mechanism for assuring that a
corporation, facing a potentially disruptive takeover, has the
opportunity to consider and possibly protect the interests of
persons other than investors. Providing consideration for such
"others" is the aim of state takeover statutes at their best, however crudely and imperfectly they are presently designed. 136
Possibly a corporate statute seeking to protect noninvestor
interests through more direct bestowal of management discretion is also suspect under a rigid reading of federal policy. For
example, Pennsylvania has enacted a statute explicitly authorizing directors and officers, in determining the company's best
interests, to consider the effects of any action upon "employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities
in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located and all other pertinent factors." 137 This statute avoids
the ambivalence of the control share acquisition statute and directly empowers, but does not require or guide, management
to consider noninvestor interests in formulating corporate behavior. 3 81 In effect, the Pennsylvania Legislature has decreed

that corporations do not exist solely to provide premiums for
shareholders and that corporate management is the appropriate mechanism for balancing various claims on a corporation,
in a takeover as in operating decisions. Yet, such a statute
136. See, e.g., 1984 Minn. Laws at 470-71.
137. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1408B (Purdon Supp. 1985).
138. The board of directors and officers may be more appropriate mechanisms for
considering noninvestor interests than shareholders. Minnesota's control share acquisition statute ostensibly provides that shareholders, who probably do not care
about such matters, should decide the fate of the takeover. As indicated, however,
Minnesota's statute allows management to play a role in the offer by introducing
delay. During the delay management may respond to the takeover in a manner that
takes account of other interests. Whether doing so is appropriate management behavior is an important question for corporate governance as well as for preemption
analysis. Pennsylvania has answered this affirmatively by statute. Most courts have
acquiesced to whatever management has done in a takeover because of the business
judgment rule. Minnesota's statute is more tentative, but this Article has argued that
it too contemplates an important role for corporate management in a takeover, not
just a role for shareholders.
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might be infirm because it is state action favoring management. It does not favor management as an end in itself, but it
affords management a basis for resisting-i.e., not being "neutral" toward-a takeover that, all noninvestor interests aside, is
good for shareholders, the favored group of federal policy. As
indicated, however, such an analysis would appear to be too
strong a reading of the policy of neutrality for Justices Powell
and Stevens, and would be a rather drastic incurison into state
power to regulate corporate, not merely shareholder,
behavior.
The eventual outcome of the present "proinvestor" reading
of the Constitution is, of course, unknown. For those concerned about the influence of corporate behavior on society, it
is troubling to see the commerce clause and the national policy
of shareholder protection be interpreted as prohibiting state
efforts to deal with the effects of takeovers on noninvestor interests. Takeover participants and observers should not forget
that reconciling investor desires for premiums with a diversity
of other corporate claimants is the fundamental issue raised by
the takeover phenomenon and efforts to regulate it.
CONCLUSION

The appearance of evidence that corporate combinations do
not, as claimed in MITE and Van Dusen, necessarily advance
society's efficiency concerns requires a judicial rethinking of
the precise manner in which state takeover legislation "burdens" interstate commerce. If there is at least some doubt as
to whether takeovers generally serve society's desire for an efficient use of resources, or serve to unseat incompetent management, then the primary adverse effect of state legislation that
succeeds in curbing takeover activity may simply be the loss of
premiums by investors. Such an effect on the capital markets,
being interstate in character, is undoubtedly a "burden" on
commerce. Yet it is a burden that, standing alone, may weigh
less heavily when balanced against legitimate reasons for state
concern about widespread takeover activity.
Minnesota's control share acquisition statute, one state's expression of concern about contests for corporate control, is
ambivalent in aim. Is it a shareholder protection act, or does it
seek to protect other interests? This Article has suggested
that, while defensible as a shareholder protection measure, the
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statute's strongest feature, however inartfully it may have been
accomplished, is the attempt to avoid the pre-ordained conclusion that corporations exist solely to provide investors with
stock premiums. This attitude toward a corporation's raison
d'etre is particularly significant in light of evidence that the interests of investors and those of society (i.e., efficiency concerns) do not necessarily coincide. In seeking to avoid the
purchase and sale of corporations like so much produce in a
marketplace, a marketplace that works less efficiently than
many will admit, the State of Minnesota has recognized the importance of the modern corporation to numerous noninvestor
interests and, at a minimum, has acknowledged uncertainty as
to how those interests fare as a result of frequent takeover
activity.
The "benefit" aimed at-consideration by some responsible
group, whether shareholders or, more properly, management,
of competing interests in a takeover fray-is very real. Undoubtedly, entrusting management with such responsibility is
not without potentially serious problems and clearly the outcome of doing so in a particular case is uncertain simply because assessing and reconciling various claims on a
corporation is a difficult task, one that requires discretion and
a certain latitude of action. Such assessing and reconciling is
understandably frustrating because it is the method of messy,
institutional answers to complex problems rather than an elegant, easy, and "scientific" solution.
This author believes that the benefits of Minnesota's statute
outweigh the burden on interstate commerce and, that the
statute can coexist with the pro-investor orientation of federal
policy. That is not to suggest that individual states have always
legislated wisely in this area or that they are better equipped
than Congress to deal with the issues raised by takeovers. If,
however, states are constitutionally unable to legislate in the
takeover area, then, absent a change in federal policy, investors
are presently the favored constituency of corporations facing
takeovers. That outcome, if constitutionally mandated, might
cause concern. Perhaps the need to determine the constitutionality of state legislation such as Minnesota's will prompt
persons involved in the takeover debate-members of Congress particularly, but also business people, investors, and
others-to focus on the fundamental questions of what interPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
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ests we, as a modern society, expect corporations to serve and
how, constitutionally, that might be accomplished.
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